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INTRODUCTION
On January 18, 2018, in a series of terminations, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) announced it would not further extend
Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) for the country of El Salvador,
determining that the conditions of the country no longer supported its need
for TPS. 1 Since 2001, this TPS designation was a legal protection that
allowed Salvadorans to temporarily reside in the United States (“U.S.”)
due to the damaging effects caused by a series of earthquakes in the
region. 2 Approximately half of Salvadoran TPS beneficiaries have resided
and worked in the U.S. for two decades but are now facing the possibility
of forced removal from the country they have long called home. 3
After the TPS termination, Crista Ramos, a high school freshman, was
faced with an unfathomable decision. 4 Crista’s mother has lived in the U.S.
since she was 12 years old as a TPS holder, but she now faces possible
deportation. 5 As a consequence, Crista was seemingly presented with two
choices: (1) continue to reside in California alone or (2) move to El
Salvador with her mother. 6 Instead choosing a third option, Crista and her
family decided to pursue litigation and vocalize this injustice. 7 Throughout
these efforts, Crista was even afforded the opportunity to travel to Rome
and meet Pope Francis with hopes of gaining his support in her fight to

Copyright 2022, by REAGAN MOODY.
* J.D./D.C.L., 2022, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. The author extends her sincerest gratitude to Professor Darlene Goring
and Professor Pedro Gerson for their time, guidance, and encouragement and the
Journal of Energy Law and Resources Volume IX and Volume X board members
for their careful edits and insightful comments. Additionally, the author extends
her gratitude to her family and friends for their unwavering love and support
throughout the writing and production process.
1. Termination of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected
Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 2654 (Jan. 18, 2018); Farida Jhabvala Romero, California
Teen Leads Suit to Keep Hundreds of Thousands of Immigrants in U.S., KQED
(Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.kqed.org/news/11714388/california-teen-leadssuit-to-keep-hundreds-of-thousands-of-immigrants-in-u-s [https://perma.cc/LKX
8-ETBL].
2. Romero, supra note 1; Class Action Complaint, Ramos v. Nielsen, 2018
WL 4823816 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2018) (No. 18-cv-1554).
3. Class Action Complaint, supra note 2.
4. Romero, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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urge Congress for permanent protections for TPS holders. 8 During her
visit, the Pope offered these words to Crista and other children of TPS
beneficiaries: “Keep fighting. Migrating is a human right. Is that clear?
And nobody can stop it.” 9
In Ramos v. Wolf, the district court recognized the arduous conditions
still present in El Salvador and ruled in favor of Crista and the plaintiffs,
issuing a preliminary injunction barring TPS terminations for El Salvador,
Sudan, Nicaragua, and Haiti. 10 However, on September 14, 2020, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction,
leaving no remedy for Crista and her family. 11
Although Crista’s mother and other TPS beneficiaries were originally
displaced by a singular environmental event, conditions in many TPS
designated countries have worsened each year due to climate change.12
Thus, TPS holders are not temporarily affected as the name suggests.
Rather, climate change has resulted in an abundance of long-lasting
effects, contributing to the rise of climate migration.
In general, climate migration is the displacement of individuals from
their homelands due to climate change. 13 Greenhouse gas emissions give
rise to climate change induced events such as sudden onset disasters, slow
on-set environmental degradation, “sinking” small island states,
governmental designation of high-risk areas too dangerous for human
habitation, and indirectly, civil unrest. 14 Developing countries are most at
risk to these hazards, as poverty can be linked to greater dependence on
climate-sensitive resources such as access to clean water. 15 As a result,
habitable land is lost, access to natural resources is reduced, and
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2020).
11. See id. at 878–79.
12. I will adopt the United Nations’ definition of climate changes for this
Comment: “Climate change refers to long-term shifts in temperatures and weather
patterns. These shifts may be natural, such as through variations in the solar cycle.
But since the 1800s, human activities have been the main driver of climate change,
primarily due to burning fossil fuels like coal, oil and gas. Burning fossil fuels
generates greenhouse gas emissions that act like a blanket wrapped around the
Earth, trapping the sun’s heat and raising temperatures.” What Is Climate
Change?, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/what-is-cli
mate-change [https://perma.cc/4XP6-8F3R] (last visited Feb. 7, 2022).
13. Autumn Skye Bordner, Climate Migration & Self-Determination, 51
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 183, 186 (2019).
14. Katrina Miriam Wyman, Responses to Climate Migration, 37 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 167, 171 (2013).
15. Id. at 173.
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individuals are prompted to migrate. 16 In sum, rising temperatures are
driving climate migrants away from the poorest and hottest parts of the
world. 17
The Ninth Circuit in Ramos and the TPS statute both emphasize that
the U.S. affords no long-term legal protections for individuals who endure
such catastrophic environmental effects, despite the onset of climate
change and years of extending TPS designations for other intervening
environmental causes. 18 While the policies enforced through TPS once
served its beneficiaries well, the Ramos decision reveals an injustice that
cannot be redressed by current law or the plain language of the TPS statute.
Therefore, the U.S. must provide a legal remedy through amendments to
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) formally recognizing climate
change migrants as a specified group of protected persons and providing a
pathway to permanent residency.
Part I of this Comment will provide the background of TPS and recent
litigation: Ramos v. Wolf, Bhattarai v. Nielsen, and Saget v. Trump. This
series of cases illustrates the issues that arose from the Trump
administration gradually dissolving TPS. Part II of this Comment will
further outline the risks and legal problems associated with climate change
in accordance with the global and national effects of climate migration.
These arguments stress TPS’s ineffectiveness, as it has become a de facto
solution in the accommodation of climate change migrants. Part III of this
Comment will provide information on the current definition of “refugee”
within the INA and its inability to encompass legal protections for climate
change migrants. Part IV of this Comment will then present a legal
solution for the classification of climate change migrants within the INA.
Subsequent recommendations to bolster this proposal will also be
provided.

16. Id. at 174.
17. See Abrahm Lustgarten, Where Will Everyone Go?, PROPUBLICA (July
23, 2020), https://features.propublica.org/climate-migration/model-how-climaterefugees-move-across-continents/ [https://perma.cc/2GWP-B9SH].
18. Miriam Jordan, 400,000 Immigrants Can Be Forced to Leave the U.S.,
Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/
us/immigrants-temporary-protected-status.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur&
fbclid=IwAR0naeUxCVshuiZfzc5IcbmWDZYl3l41sCxpFuiP3hwlLx4KeLL8F
HkuClc [https://perma.cc/P3G7-J69Z].
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I. BACKGROUND: TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS AND ITS HISTORY OF
PROTECTING CLIMATE CHANGE MIGRANTS
This section will articulate the legal and humanitarian protections that
TPS intended to provide but are now hindering TPS beneficiaries and their
families. The legislative intent of TPS was to provide a temporary safe
haven for individuals escaping harm; however, the present application of
TPS is contrary to that goal. 19 Further, the DHS attempted to strip the
minimal reliability TPS currently offers for climate change migrants
pursuant to the Trump administration’s “America First” agenda.20 Ramos
v. Wolf, Bhattarai v. Nielsen, and Saget v. Trump all illustrate the hardship
and uncertainty that is the foundation for the ongoing legal battles
regarding the protection of TPS beneficiaries and their families.
A. Temporary Protected Status
Congress established TPS designations through the enactment of the
INA. 21 The INA directs the Secretary of Homeland Security (the
"Secretary”) to designate a country as eligible for TPS when temporary
conditions inhibit the safety of the country’s nationals, such as an ongoing
armed conflict, environmental disaster, epidemic, or any other
extraordinary and temporary condition. 22 The federal government is then
prohibited from removing individuals from the U.S. who are granted
TPS. 23

19. See Claire Bergeron, Temporary Protected Status After 25 Years:
Addressing the Challenge of Long-Term “Temporary” Residents and
Strengthening a Centerpiece of US Humanitarian Protection, 2 J. ON MIGRATION
& HUM. SEC. 22 (2014), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/23315
0241400200103 [https://perma.cc/5TV4-URG6]; see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-627
(1988).
20. Appellees’ Answering Brief, Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (2019) (No.
18-16981), 2019 WL 468274, at *8.
21. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1). The TPS statute designates the Attorney General
of the U.S. as the authority for determinations, however, TPS was enacted before
the creation of DHS in 2002. Thus, when DHS was established, most of the
Attorney General’s immigration-related authority was transferred to the
Secretary. JILL H. WILSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY
PROTECTED STATUS AND DEFERRED ENFORCED DEPARTURE 2 n.9 (2021).
23. Id. § 1254a(a)(1)(A).
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TPS is currently designated for ten different countries, 24 and over
400,000 individuals benefit from the designations. 25 The DHS asserts that
these benefits are temporary and do not provide a pathway to permanent
resident status or any other immigration status. 26 However, beneficiaries
may apply for other immigration benefits or protections for which they are
eligible. 27 Further, these beneficiaries can also obtain an employment
authorization document and may be granted travel authorization. 28
A foreign state’s TPS designation can last for no less than six months
and no more than 18 months, a time period specified by the Secretary. 29
However, at least 60 days before the designation period expires, the
Secretary must review the foreign state’s conditions and determine
whether the designation should remain in effect. 30 The length of these
extensions can either be six, 12, or 18 months. 31 This process applies to
any extension periods enforced thereafter. 32 In contrast, if the Secretary
determines these extraordinary conditions are no longer present within the
foreign state, then the designation in question must be terminated. 33
However, the Secretary in prior administrations determined the
extension or termination of a foreign state’s TPS designation by
considering intervening causes such as subsequent natural disasters and
economic crises. 34 Although such language is not codified within the TPS
statute, the Trump administration ignored years of this well-established

24. The TPS designated countries include: Burma (Myanmar), El Salvador,
Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria,
Venezuela, and Yemen. The TPS terminations for El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Nepal, and Sudan will not go into effect until litigation regarding these
decisions is finalized. Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZEN & IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status [https://
perma.cc/W729-5UPM] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
25. Class Action Complaint, supra note 2.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f).
27. See Temporary Protected Status, supra note 24. Such actions include: (1)
applying for nonimmigrant status; (2) filing for adjustment of status based on an
immigration petition; or (3) applying for any other immigration benefit or
protection of which an individual may be eligible. Id.
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a.
29. Id. § 1254a(b)(2).
30. Id. § 1254a(3)(A).
31. Id. § 1254a(3)(C).
32. Id. § 1254a(3)(A).
33. Id. § 1254a(3)(B).
34. See Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872, 908 (9th Cir. 2020) (Christen,
dissenting).
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practice and refused to factor intervening circumstances into these
decisions, thus terminating several existing TPS designations. 35
B. Current Litigation Surrounding TPS Designations and Terminations
Although TPS was legislatively intended for temporary use, the
practice of extending TPS designations by prior administrations has
allowed beneficiaries to reside in the U.S. for prolonged periods, albeit
with uncertainty as to whether such extensions will continue. If continual
extensions are warranted, then the legal protections for TPS should be
solidified by unambiguous codification in order to prevent the injustices
outlined in the recent litigation.
1. Ramos v. Wolf
The TPS designation for Nicaragua was determined in 1999 as a result
of the destruction generated by Hurricane Mitch.36 The Bush and Obama
administrations extended Nicaragua’s TPS designation 13 times, citing
droughts and flooding from Hurricane Michelle in 2002 as well as issues
spurred by subsequent natural disasters and storms. 37 On December 15,
2017, Acting Secretary Elaine Duke terminated the TPS designation for
Nicaragua, stating the country’s current conditions no longer warranted a
TPS designation. 38
The TPS designation for El Salvador was implemented in 2001 due to
the disastrous effects of three earthquakes in the region. 39 As a result of
these natural disasters, 17% of the population was displaced. 40 The Bush
and Obama administrations extended the designation 11 times, citing
extensive drought, effects from Tropical Storm Stan, the Santa Ana
volcanic eruption, subsequent earthquakes, and devastation from the 2009
Hurricane Ida.41 On January 18, 2018, the TPS designation for El Salvador
was terminated. 42 Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen noted El Salvador’s
designation was terminated due to the country’s supposed recovery from
35. Id.
36. Id. at 881.
37. Id.
38. Id.; Termination of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary
Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg. 59636 (Dec. 15, 2017).
39. Ramos, 975 F.3d at 881.
40. Id. at 882.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 882–83; Termination of the Designation of El Salvador for
Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 2654 (Jan. 18, 2018).
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the conditions effectuated by the 2001 earthquakes. 43 Secretary Nielsen
could have considered the subsequent natural disasters, gang violence, and
food insecurity plaguing El Salvador today, which inhibited the country’s
full recovery. 44 However, Secretary Nielsen disregarded these hardships.45
Haiti was granted TPS designation in 2010 following a 7.0-magnitude
earthquake. 46 The earthquake affected one-third of the country’s
population and severely impaired critical infrastructure, including its
capacity for electricity, water, and telephone services.47 These
circumstances prompted alarming fuel, food, and water shortages. 48
Haiti’s TPS designation was extended or re-designated five times, with the
Trump administration responsible for one of the extensions. 49 The
extensions in 2012, 2014, and 2015 were due to floods that contributed to
a deadly cholera outbreak. 50 However, on November 20, 2017, the DHS
announced it would not extend Haiti’s TPS designation. 51 Acting
Secretary Duke attributed Haiti’s TPS termination to a lack of
extraordinary and temporary conditions relating back to the country’s
2010 earthquake, 52 despite previous Secretary John Kelly stating less than
a year earlier that “conditions in Haiti supporting its designation for TPS
persist.” 53
In sum, TPS beneficiaries from these countries were originally
displaced due to natural disasters and continued to have their TPS
designations extended or re-designated by past administrations because of
subsequent, and sometimes linked, natural disasters. 54 Notwithstanding
the subsequent natural disasters, the Trump administration maintained that
the conditions supporting the countries’ initial TPS designations were no
longer present, disregarding any other adverse conditions that may have
warranted another extension or re-designation.
43. Ramos, 975 F.3d at 882.
44. Class Action Complaint, supra note 2.
45. Id.
46. Ramos, 975 F.3d at 882.
47. Id.; Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 75 Fed. Reg.
3476, 3477 (Jan. 21, 2010).
48. Id.
49. Ramos, 975 F.3d at 882.
50. Id.
51. Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 75 Fed. Reg. at 3477.
52. Ramos, 975 F.3d at 883.
53. Class Action Complaint, supra note 2.
54. Ramos, 975 F.3d 872. TPS beneficiaries from the country of Sudan also
joined this suit due to termination; however, its TPS designation was attributed to
an ongoing civil war, not an environmental event. See id. at 880.
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In Ramos v. Wolf, TPS beneficiaries from Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Haiti, along with their U.S.-citizen children, challenged these TPS
terminations before a three-judge panel as unlawful pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 55 These plaintiffs were lawfully residing in the U.S.
for decades, building lives and growing families. 56
The plaintiffs first argued the Secretary’s actions “violated the APA
by departing from prior practice without an adequate explanation.” 57 The
plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary’s decision to depart from multiple prior
administrations’ precedent of intervening events in TPS determinations
should have been adequately explained before the TPS terminations were
issued, as such an abrupt change in practice was “arbitrary and
capricious.” 58 However, the Ninth Circuit found the APA claim was
barred, stating it “fundamentally attack[ed] the Secretary’s specific TPS
determinations,” 59 and “judicial review of any TPS determination made by
the [Secretary] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension
of a designation, of a foreign state” is prohibited by the TPS statute. 60
The plaintiffs further argued the TPS decisions “were motivated by
discriminatory animus in violation of Fifth Amendment equal protection
principles.” 61 They relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., which
requires “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose . . . to show
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” 62 Specifically, the plaintiffs
claimed the terminations made by the Secretary were unjustly influenced
by President Trump’s “animus against non-white, non-European
immigrants.” 63 Evidence of President Trump’s animus include his claim
that “15,000 recent immigrants from Haiti ‘all have AIDS’” as well as his

55. Ramos, 975 F.3d at 878; Update on Ramos v. Nielsen, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/update-on-ramos-vnielsen [https://perma.cc/XD85-KRJT] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021).
56. See Ramos, 975 F.3d at 900 (Nelson, concurring).
57. Id. at 883.
58. Id. at 893.
59. Id. at 895.
60. See Ramos, 975 F.3d at 888, 893 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A)).
61. Id. at 883.
62. Appellees’ Answering Brief, supra note 20, at *17; Ramos, 975 F.3d at
896 (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977)).
63. Ramos, 975 F.3d at 897.
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remark referring to immigrants as “animals,” among other derogatory and
unsubstantiated declarations. 64
While the Ninth Circuit acknowledged President Trump’s express
racial animus toward “non-white, non-European immigrants,” the court
concluded that the Secretary’s TPS terminations were not linked to the
President’s remarks, but rather the Secretary was complying with the
standard that executive officials typically conform to the current
administration’s policies. 65 To support their conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
cited to a recent Supreme Court decision that found no racial animus
present in the Trump administration’s rescission of Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA). 66 The Ninth Circuit held that the Ramos
plaintiffs presented a “glaring lack of evidence tying the President’s
alleged discriminatory intent to the specific TPS terminations.”67 The
court concluded that this standard of intent could have been met if the
plaintiffs provided “evidence that the President personally sought to
influence the TPS terminations, or that any administration officials
involved in the TPS decision-making process were themselves motivated
by animus against ‘non-white, non-European’ countries.” 68
Additionally, the court cited that while the four countries terminated
under TPS were “non-European” with predominantly “non-white”
populations, the Trump administration extended TPS determinations for
four other countries during this time period that were also “non-European”
with predominantly “non-white” populations. 69 The Ninth Circuit
ultimately found that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to prove a
likelihood of success on the merits of their Equal Protection claim. 70
Because of this, the Ninth Circuit panel concluded that the district court
abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction barring the
implementation of the TPS terminations.71 However, a decision is pending
on the plaintiffs’ petition for further review before the entire Ninth
Circuit. 72 Therefore, the court has not yet issued its directive to the district

64. See Appellees’ Answering Brief, Ramos v. Wolf, supra note 20, at *17.
65. Ramos, 975 F.3d at 897.
66. Id. (citing Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140
S. Ct. 1891 (2020)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 898.
70. See id. at 897–89.
71. See id. at 899.
72. Update on Ramos v. Nielsen, supra note 55; Update on Bhattarai v.
Nielsen, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/
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court to make the panel’s ruling effective, and the injunction remains in
place. 73
The overarching injustice in Ramos is depicted by the uprooting of
migrants’ lives who have made homes and started families in the U.S.
Since the inception of TPS, its application has reflected a “longestablished standard allowing consideration of all current conditions,”
including intervening events. 74 Thus, TPS beneficiaries reasonably
operated under the belief that this benefit would continue to be renewed.
However, their belief was disrupted when the Trump administration
employed a narrow and restrictive view, dictating that only the “original
‘conditions that gave rise to the years-old TPS designations’” should be
considered. 75 In response to this abrupt policy change, the majority
opinion stated that the consideration of “intervening events” is a
determination left to the DHS and the “special expertise” and “institutional
competence” of the Secretary’s discretion, as found in 8 U.S.C. § 1254a. 76
While the Secretary may take “intervening events” into account, the statute
does not require such considerations, which allowed the Trump
administration to abandon the decades-long policy practice.
Judge Nelson, delivering the concurrence for the Ninth Circuit panel
in Ramos, did not discount that the TPS beneficiaries involved in the case
rightfully deserve legislative protection.77 He explained, however, that the
limitation rested upon the narrow interpretation of the law, which resulted
in TPS providing no legal remedy for the plaintiffs. 78 Unfortunately, this
legislative shortcoming extends beyond the control of the judiciary. As the
Ninth Circuit cited in City & County of San Francisco v. United States
Citizenship & Immigration Services, Congress is the governing body
responsible for addressing the deficiencies in our nation’s immigration
policies. 79

humanitarian/temporary-protected-status/update-on-bhattarai-v-nielsen [https://
perma.cc/QWK9-X2DR] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
73. Update on Ramos v. Nielsen, supra note 55; Update on Bhattarai v.
Nielsen, supra note 72.
74. Appellees’ Answering Brief, Ramos v. Wolf, supra note 20, at *7.
75. Id.
76. See Ramos, 975 F.3d at 893.
77. See id. at 900 (Nelson, R., concurring).
78. See id.
79. “By constitutional design, the branch that is qualified to establish
immigration policy and check any excesses in the implementation of that policy
is Congress.” City & Cnty. of S.F. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 944 F.3d
773, 809 (9th Cir. 2019).
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2. Bhattarai v. Nielsen
Simultaneously with Ramos, litigation regarding the TPS terminations
of Nepal and Honduras is ongoing in Bhattarai v. Nielsen. The TPS
designation for Nepal was initially determined in 2015 after a 7.8magnitude earthquake and its aftershocks affected the region.80 As a result,
approximately 9,000 people were killed; 20,000 were injured; and millions
were displaced. 81 The designation was then extended in 2016 due to civil
unrest, obstruction at the borders, and inadequate sanitation. These
conditions were either wholly or partially unrelated to the initial natural
disaster. 82 On April 26, 2018, Secretary Nielsen terminated the TPS
designation for Nepal, stating that the country had since recovered from
the 2015 earthquake. 83
The TPS designation for Honduras was implemented in 1999
following Hurricane Mitch. 84 Prior administrations extended the
designation 14 times, citing additional environmental disasters, a
deteriorating economy, and a political crisis subsequently affecting
economic activity. 85 Nonetheless, on May 4, 2018, Secretary Nielsen
terminated the TPS designation for Honduras, concluding that the country
had since recovered from Hurricane Mitch.86
On February 10, 2019, TPS beneficiaries and their children from
Nepal and Honduras filed a class action complaint alleging violations of
the APA and Equal Protection Clause just as the plaintiffs did in Ramos. 87
The complaint contained an additional claim that the Secretary violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 88
The petitioners stated that the Trump administration’s standard for
determining TPS extensions and terminations was motivated by the
“intentional race-, ethnicity-, and national-origin-based animus against
TPS holders” and thus violated “the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” 89 Therefore, due to the similar issues

80. See Complaint, Bhattarai v. Nielsen, 2019 WL 528658 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(No. 19-cv-731).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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raised in Ramos, the district court in Bhattarai will stay proceedings
pending the outcome of the Ramos appeal. 90
3. Saget v. Trump
On May 31, 2018, the plaintiffs in Saget v. Trump challenged thenActing Secretary Duke’s TPS termination of Haiti.91 The plaintiffs
claimed the termination was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
discretion, and in violation of the APA, the Regulatory Flexibility Act , 92
and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. 93
On April 11, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Haiti’s TPS
termination, which will remain in effect pending resolution of the case. 94
The court held that the judicial review provision of the TPS statute95 does
not bar review of Secretary Duke’s decision-making process in her TPS
termination of Haiti; rather, it merely bars direct review of individual TPS
determinations. 96 The TPS statute does not grant the Secretary with
“unfettered discretion,” nor does it provide her with “sole and
unreviewable discretion.” 97 Rather, the TPS statute requires the Secretary
to: “(1) consult with appropriate government agencies; (2) publish the
basis for a determination in the federal register; and (3) terminate a foreign
state's TPS if that state no longer meets the conditions for designation.” 98
Thus, according to the TPS statute and the APA’s “strong presumption in

90. Update on Bhattarai v. Nielsen, supra note 72.
91. Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
92. Id. at 329. The Court rejected the Regulatory Flexibility Act argument as
the plaintiff, Haiti Liberté, is not a regulated small entity “adversely affected or
aggrieved by final agency action” as required by the Act to be afforded judicial
review. Thus, Haiti Liberté lacked prudential standing to bring the claim. Id. at
338.
93. Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 329.
94. Temporary Protected Status Designated Country: Haiti, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporaryprotected-status/temporary-protected-status-designated-country-haiti [https://per
ma.cc/WXM3-YGYT] (last visited Oct. 25, 2021).
95. 8 U.S.C. §1254a(b)(5)(A).
96. Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 331.
97. Id. at 332.
98. Id.
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favor of judicial review,” 99 the court possessed subject matter jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs’ claims in seeking a preliminary injunction. 100
For a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs must demonstrate either a
likelihood of success on the merits or serious questions on the merits and
a balance of hardships favoring the moving party. 101 Additionally, the
plaintiffs must demonstrate irreparable harm and that a preliminary
injunction would be in the public interest. 102 Addressing the first
requirement, the court found a likelihood of success on the merits of the
plaintiffs’ APA claim. 103 The court reasoned that Secretary Duke did not
base her decision to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation “on an objective,
inter-agency assessment” as required by the TPS statute.104 Further, her
decision constituted an arbitrary and capricious action as she was
“improperly influenced by the White House” and “departed from past
agency practices without explanation.” 105 Lastly, Secretary Duke’s
decision was determined to be pretextual and made in bad faith, as she
terminated Haiti’s TPS designation “for the sake of ‘agenda adherence’ to
the ‘America first’ platform.” 106
Due to evidence indicative of potential White House animus toward
non-white immigrants and its influence on Secretary Duke's decision, the
court found that the plaintiffs raised serious questions on the merits of the
Equal Protection claim as well. 107 Specifically, in June 2017, President
Trump stated in a meeting, which included then-Secretary John Kelly, that
Haitians “all have AIDS.” 108 While serving in the capacity of President
Trump’s Chief of Staff, John Kelly also stated that Haitians were “welfare
recipients.” 109 As concluded in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, “Although the use
of racial slurs, epithets, or racially charged language does not violate equal
protection per se, it can be evidence that official action was motivated by
unlawful discriminatory purposes.” 110

99. Id. at 330.
100. Id. at 333.
101. Id. at 339.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 340.
104. Id. at 345.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 343–45.
107. Id. at 372.
108. Id. at 371.
109. Id. at 372.
110. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d
260, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)).
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Addressing the irreparable harm requirement, the harm must be an
actual, imminent injury that could not be remedied if a court chose to await
final adjudication on the merits. 111 Further, as serious questions on the
merits of the Equal Protection claim were raised, the balance of the
hardships must be weighed in favor of the plaintiffs. 112 If the Haitian TPS
beneficiaries were to remain in the U.S., no concrete harms would arise. 113
In contrast, despite the temporary nature of TPS, the court found the “deep
psychological pain” and “financial hardships” caused by the termination
would force the plaintiffs to suffer a significant and irreparable harm, 114
provoking the court to order a preliminary injunction that aligned with the
interests 115 of the public. 116 The court emphatically stated: “Once TPS
beneficiaries are removed, the Government’s actions cannot be
undone.” 117 Thus, the harm was found to be imminent and actual, allowing
all elements of a preliminary injunction to be satisfied.118 The court
enjoined the TPS termination for Haiti on a nationwide basis, and as in
Ramos and Bhattarai, the preliminary injunction will remain in effect until
the case is resolved. 119
4. The Biden Administration’s Response
Following this series of cases, the Trump administration was replaced
by President Joe Biden’s newly elected administration, bringing with it
subsequent changes to TPS status. On September 10, 2021, the DHS
issued a Federal Register notice that TPS beneficiaries from El Salvador,
Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sudan will retain their TPS and TPS documentation
until December 31, 2022, while the preliminary injunctions in Ramos and

111. Id. at 374 (citing Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 408 F.3d 112, 114
(2d Cir. 2005)).
112. See id. at 378.
113. See id. at 377.
114. Id. at 376.
115. Due to the Government being a party, the balance of hardships and public
interest merged as one factor. Essentially, the Government’s interest is public
interest. Id. at 339–40.
116. Thus, because the balance of hardship and public interest merged as one
factor, the balance of hardship tipping in the plaintiffs’ favor satisfied the
requirement that a preliminary injunction would be in public interest. Id. at 377–
78.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 379.
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Saget remain in effect. 120 The notice also extended TPS and TPS
documentation until December 31, 2022, to the TPS beneficiaries from
Honduras and Nepal while the stay of the proceedings in Bhattarai
continues. 121 The DHS further provided that future notices will be
published as necessary to comply with court orders. 122
Additionally, on May 22, 2021, Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas
announced a new TPS designation for Haiti that will last for 18 months,
effective August 3, 2021, through February 3, 2023. 123 The designation
provides that Haitian nationals who have continuously resided in the U.S.
since July 29, 2021, and have been continuously present in the U.S. since
August 3, 2021, should apply for TPS. 124 Following review, the DHS and
the Department of State (DOS) determined that Haiti’s TPS designation
was warranted due to extraordinary and temporary conditions, such as
increased vulnerability to natural hazards that have been further
exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. 125
120. Update on Ramos v. Nielsen, supra note 55; Continuation of
Documentation for Beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status Designations for
El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Sudan, Honduras, and Nepal, 86 Fed. Reg. 50725,
50726 (Sept. 10, 2021).
121. Continuation of Documentation for Beneficiaries of Temporary Protected
Status Designations for El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Sudan, Honduras, and
Nepal, 86 Fed. Reg. at 50726; see also Update on Ramos v. Nielsen, supra note
55.
122. Essentially, the issues presented for TPS beneficiaries in Ramos,
Battarai, and Saget are in a flux until a terminal ruling is issued by the federal
judiciary. Update on Ramos v. Nielsen, supra note 55; Continuation of
Documentation for Beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status Designations for
El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Sudan, Honduras, and Nepal, 86 Fed. Reg. at
50726.
123. The previous designation for Haiti and the termination currently being
challenged in Ramos and Saget protected approximately 55,000 beneficiaries.
However, this new designation for Haiti includes those previous beneficiaries as
well as potentially 100,000 more individuals, totaling an estimated 155,000
beneficiaries. Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 86 Fed. Reg.
41863, 41863 (Aug. 3, 2021); Temporary Protected Status Designated Country:
Haiti, supra note 94.
124. The designation also instructed “TPS beneficiaries whose TPS has been
continued pursuant to court orders” to re-apply for TPS following the notice in
the Federal Register. Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 86 Fed.
Reg. at 41863. This indicates that the beneficiaries who are protected under the
preliminary injunctions in Ramos and Saget should re-apply for TPS under this
new designation.
125. Id.
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5. Revealing the Fragility of TPS
As final decisions in Ramos, Bhattarai, and Saget have yet to
materialize, and although the Biden administration has attempted to
provide solace for the beneficiaries in these cases, one issue remains clear:
these terminations were products of the Trump administration’s efforts to
eliminate TPS entirely. Environmentally displaced individuals, whether
affected by temporary or permanent events, would be afforded no legal
protections in the U.S., a country in which they have lawfully resided for
years. Even if TPS were to remain in effect, the TPS statute’s goal to
provide temporary and immediate relief for those affected by natural
disasters still leaves no legal remedy available for those who suffer the
permanent effects of climate change.
Alternatively, the natural disasters that prompt TPS determinations
likely do not fit the definition of “temporary,” as these events are the result
of the pervasive climate change phenomenon. Thus, the language of TPS
is contradictory, as a program to provide temporary relief for permanent
environmental effects is clearly insufficient. This discrepancy would
further affirm that no explicit legal protections are offered to individuals
displaced by ongoing and continuous environmental events occurring in a
particular country—a point the Ninth Circuit made abundantly clear.
While TPS is admirable in theory, its modern day application cannot fulfill
the needs of environmentally displaced persons. The escalation of climate
change over time has revealed the inadequacy of this supposed legal
protection, as a temporary solution cannot accommodate the permanent
issues that TPS beneficiaries face.
II. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RISE OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND
CLIMATE MIGRATION
To address the lack of legal protections for individuals experiencing
long-term damage from a natural disaster, climate change’s effects on
forced migration must first be examined. Recently, The New York Times,
ProPublica, and the Pulitzer Center published a study regarding the
migration of people across borders. 126 The study determined that migration
will increase every year regardless of the condition of the climate. 127
However, as the climate changes, the number of migrants rises
significantly. 128 Accounting for the most extreme of scenarios, the study
126. Lustgarten, supra note 17.
127. Id.
128. Id. If the U.S. took even a modest approach in reducing climate change
emissions, approximately 680,000 climate migrants might migrate from Central
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projected that more than 30 million climate migrants could travel toward
the U.S. southern border over the next 30 years. 129
A. Human Migration Patterns in Relation to Climate Change
In 2007, Alan B. Krueger, a labor economist, and Michael
Oppenheimer, a climate geoscientist, developed a study on the
environment’s effect on individuals’ decisions to migrate based on
economic insight. 130 Specifically, the pair examined the statistical
relationship between census data, crop yields, and historical weather
patterns in Mexico and how farmers acclimated to drought in the region. 131
Published in 2010, Krueger and Oppenheimer’s study revealed that
Mexican migration to the U.S. drastically increased during periods of
drought. 132 Additionally, the study predicted that climate change could
prompt 6.7 million individuals to migrate toward the southern U.S. border
by 2080. 133 Krueger and Oppenheimer also noted that while such
projections are merely an estimate due to the inconsistent nature of human
decision-making and migration, it is still pertinent that society begins to
grasp the gravity of the situation involving individuals and climate
change. 134
While the precise numbers and reasoning behind human migration are
difficult to ascertain, evidence of climate change migration on both a small
and large scale has been revealed. 135 From 2007 to 2010, subtle migration
occurred in Syria when extreme drought contributed to crop failure,
prompting residents to move toward cities. 136
On a larger scale, one-fourth of the global population resides in South
Asia, and the World Bank predicts this region will soon be home to the
America to the U.S. between now and the year 2050. Id. However, that estimate
drastically increases to more than one million migrants if the emissions continue
unabated; undocumented immigrants are not included in that estimation, which
could potentially double the number. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Colin P. Kelley et al., Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and
Implications of the Recent Syrian Drought, 112 PNAS 3241 (2015),
https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2015/02/23/1421533112 [https://perma.cc/V
S43-XQTU].
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highest food insecurity in the world. 137 Already, 8.5 million previous
residents have migrated, with most now living in the Persian Gulf; 17 to
36 million more individuals will likely be forced to migrate as well. 138
Posing an even greater concern, toward the end of the century, heat and
humidity are predicted to rise at such an alarming rate that individuals
residing in South Asia will die without air conditioning. 139 Rising seas will
also contribute to large-scale migration in the future, as high tides are
projected to submerge multiple regions of Vietnam, China, Thailand, Iraq,
and Egypt. 140 Additionally, coastal regions in the U.S. are also extremely
susceptible to this danger. 141
B. Effects of Open and Closed Borders in Response to Climate Change
The model developed by The New York Times, ProPublica, and the
Pulitzer Center details the likelihood of risks associated with climate
change and migration depending on whether the U.S. chooses to further
open its borders or, alternatively, forcefully close its borders. 142
If the U.S. were to relax its immigration regulations, globalization
would still continue. 143 Factoring in climate change, drought, and food
insecurity in the rural regions of Mexico and other Central American
countries would subsequently push residents out of the countryside,
prompting millions to seek relief in large cities and further contribute to
mass urbanization. 144 Eventually, these individuals would migrate north,
resulting in the largest influx of migrants toward the U.S. 145
In contrast, if the U.S. were to limit border passage, migrants would
be turned back, thereby indirectly decreasing economic growth and
urbanization in Central America. 146 In turn, the population and birth rates
in Central America would rapidly rise as the region would become more
impoverished. 147 Temperatures would continue to increase, and water and
137. Lustgarten, supra note 17.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (“The projected number of migrants arriving from Central America
and Mexico rises to 1.5 million a year by 2050, from about 700,000 a year in
2025.”).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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food supplies would become scarcer, exacerbating death by starvation and
the conflicts that arise from these shortages. 148 The consequences of
building walls, both literally and figuratively, would significantly
contribute to these deaths. 149 To avoid such gross injustice, greenhouse
gases and other harmful emissions must be reduced, and instead of strictly
stifling migration, doors should be opened rather than closed.
III. EXPANDING BEYOND REFUGEE STATUS
Legal scholars have offered many viable and creative solutions to
address the lack of legal protections for climate change migrants. A
popular proposal includes adopting the term “environmental refugee” or
“climate change refugee,” thus expanding the definition of a “refugee”
both in the U.S. and internationally. 150 However, scholars recognize this
recommendation involves its own set of obstacles. 151
Currently, the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) defines a refugee based on persecution
or fear of persecution stemming from one of the following protected
characteristics: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group. 152 The language of the INA
similarly defines the term “refugee.” 153 Political upheaval regarding
competition over natural resources can serve as an indirect link to classify
certain climate migrants under the refugee definition; however, the actual

148. Id.
149. Id. (“Researchers suggest that the annual death toll, globally, from heat
alone will eventually rise by 1.5 million.”).
150. See Shea Flanagan, “Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled
Masses”: The Case to Reform U.S. Asylum Law to Protect Climate Change
Refugees, 13 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 1, 23–26 (2019); see also Elizabeth Keyes,
Environmental Refugees? Rethinking What’s In A Name, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 461
(2018).
151. See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 150, at 23–26; see also Keyes, supra note
150, at 461.
152. Keyes, supra note 150, at 464 (citing Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees, art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150).
153. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42) (“The term ‘refugee’ means (A) any person who is
outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having
no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided,
and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .”).
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harms of climate change are still not yet fully recognized, making it
difficult to confine climate change migrants to this classification. 154
In addition, climate change migrants are not subjects of persecution
inflicted by their government, which is a generally accepted requirement
to meet the legal definition of persecution. 155 Even if an individual’s
government fails to acknowledge or address the environmental harms
present in one’s country, the government is not actively or directly
persecuting that individual, which is necessary under the Refugee
Convention. 156
However, the INA offers an explicit example of a “refugee” within its
language and recognizes a crucial protection. In defining the term
“refugee,” the INA states that persons who have been forced or fear being
forced to abort a pregnancy or undergo involuntary sterilization are
classified under this protected class of individuals due to persecution based
on political opinion. 157 Although climate change migrants do not meet this
narrow standard, this example opens up the possibility of including
another specified group of individuals within the INA’s amendments.
IV. RECOGNIZING THE CLIMATE CHANGE MIGRANT
While the U.S. is not the only country contributing to climate change,
the nation certainly bears a considerable share. Despite being home to only
4% of the world’s population, the U.S. has contributed almost one-third of
the excess carbon dioxide currently in the atmosphere. 158 This section
explores the U.S.’ role in accommodating climate migration in accordance
with the country’s alarming emissions rates.
A. Duties to Climate Change Migrants
Recognizing the impact of climate change on human mobility and
migration is imperative for the implementation of appropriate policy
154. See Keyes, supra note 150, at 465.
155. Nicole Angeline Cudiamat, Displacement Disparity: Filling the Gap of
Protection for the Environmentally Displaced Person, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 891,
925 (2012).
156. Id.
157. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42).
158. See Kevin Loria, Trump Just Pulled Out of the Paris Agreement – But the
US Has Contributed More to Climate Change Than Any Other Country, BUS.
INSIDER (June 1, 2017, 4:36 PM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/
stocks/us-effect-on-climate-change-co2-emissions-warming-2017-6 [https://per
ma.cc/D2T4-VULA].
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practices. However, forcing climate change migrants into the current and
longstanding definition of a refugee is inadequate. Rather, based on the
evidence and information acquired, U.S. immigration laws must
acknowledge the current reality and thus formally define this unique class
of individuals. Through proper classification, a program could be
developed to integrate climate change migrants into the U.S. and thus
afford them necessary support, protection, and resettlement opportunities.
Such integration has occurred domestically on a smaller scale without
any assistance from the legislative branch. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina
aggressively swept across the Gulf Coast, leaving many New Orleans
residents without a home. As a result, these residents relocated to different
communities, including Houston. 159 Evaluating the impact years later,
climate migrants from New Orleans successfully integrated into Houston
without causing massive, localized distress among the region. 160 Thus, as
this illustration of domestic displacement demonstrates, the U.S. is capable
of sustaining a larger international influx of climate migrants through
appropriate organization, legislation, and interdisciplinary measures.
Historically, our country has also recognized a limited duty in
receiving individuals who are fleeing a harm created by the U.S.161 Such
a circumstance occurred when Vietnamese refugees were faced with
tremendous hardship as the U.S. withdrew the military from their
country. 162 The U.S. arguably possesses a similar duty in the context of
climate change, as the nation bears a sizable portion of its underlying
causes. 163 Even when examining the Vietnamese refugees’ post-war
circumstances, the pollution inflicted by the U.S.’ utilization of the Agent
Orange herbicide vastly affected the region with environmental
consequences still present today. 164
More than 50 years later, the byproducts of Agent Orange have
contaminated the waters of Vietnam and consequently restricted food
supply. 165 As such, the U.S. government plans to provide an estimated $30
million annually over a ten-year period to rehabilitate the country’s
159. Keyes, supra note 150, at 486.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 482.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. Christopher Carbone, Toxic Byproducts of Agent Orange Continue to
Pollute Vietnam Environment, Researchers Say, FOX NEWS (Feb. 28, 2019, 12:10
PM), https://www.foxnews.com/science/toxic-byproducts-of-agent-orange-cont
inue-to-pollute-vietnam-environment-researchers-say [https://perma.cc/HV5MXLTR].
165. Id.
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wildlife and ecosystem from Agent Orange’s toxins. 166 Due to the U.S.’
significant contribution to the climate change phenomenon as illustrated
in the example above, U.S. intervention based on a harm to which the
nation contributed would not be unprecedented.
B. A Call for Legislation
As the urgency to respond to climate change increases, so too does the
urgency to reform current immigration law. Opportunity for change is
available and must emerge from the legislative branch, as the judicial
branch is the inappropriate body. Through current initiatives—such as the
Green New Deal—and inspiration from international statutes, the U.S. can
properly provide climate change migrants with reliable legal protections.
1. Structure
As Congress has failed to respond to the evolution of climate change
and migration patterns, a program that keenly focuses on climate change
migrants is vital and would require significant legislation to amend the
INA statute. In deciding whether a country or a region of a specific country
is eligible under such a climate migrant program, the Secretary should first
determine that increased changes in the climate have rendered that land
uninhabitable for individuals so as to justify a pathway to permanent
residency in the U.S. For the most optimal and thorough determinations,
the Secretary should not act alone. Rather, it should be strictly required,
that these drastic decisions regarding the viability of a country’s
environment be deliberated and concluded with the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Secretary of State as
well.
Through collaboration between the DHS, EPA, and DOS, proper
expert determinations can be made regarding key issues such as imposing
a statutory numerical limit of recipients for the program and crafting a
formal definition of a “climate change migrant.” In regard to a statutory
numerical limit of recipients, this scheme would coincide with the
numerical caps currently imposed for the U.S.’ visa programs and refugee
protections, allowing for uniformity among our nation’s immigration laws.
In contrast, not implementing a statutory cap should be considered, as
climate change migrants account for only 5% of all migrants, and studies
suggest that opening opportunities for immigration increases both the local

166. Id.
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and global economy. 167 Likewise, crafting a proper definition of a climate
change migrant is equally important, as no definition has yet to be
universally concluded. In considering these subjects, the nation’s
immigration policies and its understanding of climate change’s gravity
could be appropriately balanced and considered through the collective
efforts of the DHS, EPA, and DOS.
Introduction of a new program and formal classification of immigrants
would present a profound set of challenges, specifically in light of today’s
political climate. If such a proposal were to come to fruition, fallacies will
inevitably exist, as it is far-reaching for the U.S. alone to sustain the
magnitude of this escalating humanitarian crisis. Regardless, engaging in
these conversations is important to actively collaborate and produce
substantive and positive changes in this dynamic area of law.
2. Green New Deal
A climate change migrant program would align with the purpose and
mission of the Green New Deal. Introduced in the House of
Representatives on February 7, 2019, the non-binding resolution outlines
policies to the fight against climate change.168 Specifically, the Green New
Deal notes how “climate change, pollution, and environmental destruction
have exacerbated systemic racial, regional, social, environmental, and
economic injustices . . . by disproportionately affecting indigenous
peoples, communities of color, migrant communities, deindustrialized
communities, depopulated rural communities, the poor, low-income
workers, women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities, and
youth.” 169
The resolution further describes the goal “to promote justice and
equity by stopping current, preventing future, and repairing historic
oppression of indigenous peoples, communities of color, migrant
communities, deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural
communities, the poor, low-income workers, women, the elderly, the
unhoused, people with disabilities, and youth” 170 To provide a program
167. Lustgarten, supra note 17; L.S. & E.H., The Case for Immigration, THE
ECONOMIST (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018
/04/16/the-case-for-immigration [https://perma.cc/7VT2-T792].
168. Emily Holden, What Is the Green New Deal and How Would It Benefit
Society?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2019, 7:43 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2019/feb/11/green-new-deal-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-ed-markey
[https://perma.cc/SM93-TLH6].
169. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019).
170. Id.
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addressing the permanent displacement of climate change migrants would
directly coincide with this motive and assist in the furtherance of the Green
New Deal’s proposals.
3. International Environmental Protections
The U.S. has not yet attempted to establish specific environmental
protections for migrants; however, other nations have recognized its
significance and have paved a route for the U.S. to follow. For example,
Sweden and Finland offer protections to individuals who are unable to
return to their origin countries due to an environmental disaster.171 In
Sweden, this legal protection is not restricted to a temporary basis, unlike
the U.S.’ TPS statute. 172 Additionally, such an individual is not classified
as a traditional refugee, but rather they are designated as “a person
otherwise in need of protection.” 173
Similarly, Finland’s language offers “a residence permit for
humanitarian protection, if there are no grounds . . . for granting asylum
… but he or she cannot return to his or her country of origin or country of
former habitual residence as a result of an environmental catastrophe.” 174
The residence permit is “a permit issued to an alien for a purpose other
than tourism or a comparable short-term residence entitling the alien to
enter the country repeatedly and stay in the country.” 175 Furthermore,
Finland extends beyond the mere definition of a refugee and provides
climate change migrant’s long-term protection.
Additionally, the UN Human Rights Committee (the “Committee”)
recently issued a landmark ruling concerning individuals threatened by the
climate change crisis. 176 The Committee heard a case from Ionae Teitota,
a resident of the Pacific nation of Kiribati. 177 He sought protection in New
Zealand, as the rising sea levels of Kiribati have resulted in violence,
overcrowding, social tensions, lack of fresh water, and difficulty growing
171. Keyes, supra note 150, at 485.
172. See 5 ch. 1 § Aliens Act (Swedish Code of Statutes [SFS] 2005:716)
(Swed.) (2006).
173. 4 ch. 2 § Aliens Act (SFS 2005:716) (Swed.).
174. Ulkomaalaislain Muuttamisesta [Aliens Act] (Suomen säädöskokoelma
[SäädK] 301/2004) § 3 (Fin.).
175. Id. § 88a.
176. Kate Lyons, Climate Refugees Can’t Be Returned Home, Says Landmark
UN Human Rights Ruling, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2020, 12:27 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/climate-refugees-cant-be-returnedhome-says-landmark-un-human-rights-ruling [https://perma.cc/SGX5-EGBS].
177. Id.

532

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. X

crops. 178 New Zealand courts denied protection, and the Committee
upheld their position. 179 However, the Committee opened a possible door
for climate change migrants. The Committee reasoned that although “sea
level rise is likely to render the republic of Kiribati uninhabitable . . . the
timeframe of 10 to 15 years. . . could allow for intervening acts by the
republic of Kiribati, with the assistance of the international community, to
take affirmative measures to protect and, where necessary, relocate its
population.” 180 Professor Jane McAdam, Director of the Kaldor Centre for
International Refugee Law at the University of New South Wales,
elaborated on the significance of the committee’s ruling: “[W]ithout
robust action on climate at some point in the future, it could well be that
governments will, under international human rights law, be prohibited
from sending people to places where their life is at risk or where they
would face inhuman or degrading treatment.” 181
The Committee’s ruling is not formally binding on countries and their
governments, but the judgment could expose legal obligations regarding
international law between the UN’s Member States.182 More specifically,
under Article 6 183 and Article 7 184 of the UN’s International Covenant on
Civil Political Rights, governments sending migrants back to their home
countries if climate change has produced life-threatening risks or a
heightened possibility of cruel, inhuman, or oppressive treatment may be
unlawful. 185 Thus, the UN’s judgment should serve as a catalyst for the
U.S. to act, rather than react, in the redress for this class of individuals.

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. “1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16,
1966).
184. “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.” Id.
185. UN Human Rights Committee Decision on Climate Change Is a Wake-up
Call, According to UNHCR, UN REFUGEE AGENCY (Jan. 24, 2020), https://
www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/1/5e2ab8ae4/un-human-rights-committeedecision-climate-change-wake-up-call-according.html [https://perma.cc/9DPT-8
NA5].
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4. Limiting the Length of Temporary Protected Status Designations
To move forward in a progressive manner, immigration reform should
not end with the implementation of a sole climate change migrant
program. The contradictions and shortcomings currently within the TPS
language must be resolved, or alternatively, the TPS statute needs to be
repealed to conform with a climate change migrant program. In the past,
Congress has attempted to patch the faults within our nation’s immigration
laws regarding TPS. On June 4, 2019, the House of Representatives passed
the American Dream and Promise Act, which seeks to cancel removal
proceedings against certain aliens who qualified for TPS on certain past
dates. 186 These individuals would have to apply for permanent resident
status and pass the required background checks. 187 While this would
certainly be a step in the right direction, these protections can only be
afforded to individuals previously eligible for or that have had TPS on or
before September 25, 2016. 188 If this act were passed in the Senate and
became law, future TPS beneficiaries would not be afforded such legal
protections.
Executive Director of the Central American Resource Center Martha
Arevalo describes TPS as only a temporary solution, emphasizing that
many TPS beneficiaries have lived in transient status for a very long time,
constantly in limbo. 189 This uncertainty should be eliminated to protect the
thousands of families who have legally resided in the U.S. long-term and
are currently at risk of deportation amid the TPS terminations. The
intervening causes in their home countries once considered in TPS
extension determinations have since been disregarded.
To mitigate such an injustice, Congress should incorporate language
requiring the consideration of intervening causes in TPS determinations.
However, such a codification would not provide long-term protections for
TPS beneficiaries, as they would potentially be living in a constant
“temporary” status.

186. American Dream and Promise Act of 2019, H.R. 6, 116th Cong. § 211(a)
(2019).
187. Id. § 211(b).
188. See American Dream and Promise Act 2019: Bill Summary, NAT’L
IMMIGR. F. (June 4, 2019), https://immigrationforum.org/article/american-dreamand-promise-act-bill-summary/ [https://perma.cc/M7ZA-RPJN].
189. Gwen Aviles, Children of TPS Holders Fight for Their Parents’
Protection in Court, NBC NEWS (Aug. 14, 2019, 5:26 PM), https://www.nbc
news.com/news/latino/children-tps-holders-fight-their-parents-protection-courtn1042421 [https://perma.cc/3PYK-5APQ].
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Ultimately, to legitimize the goal of TPS and protect the interests of
its beneficiaries, the number of extensions should be limited, and a
permanent option provided. After five years designated as a TPS
beneficiary, if such an individual is unable to return to their foreign state
due to continued extraordinary environmental circumstances, then the
individual should be afforded legal protections under the proposed climate
change migrant program.
CONCLUSION
Climate change and its consequences pose significant issues,
consequently affecting the livelihoods of many individuals and forcing
migration. TPS in its current state cannot sustain the pattern of climate
migration. While TPS offers limited legal protections, the INA fails to
provide the appropriate, long-term remedies necessary for climate change
migrants displaced by their home countries’ environmental destruction.
Additionally, courts are unable to intervene, rendering prompt legislative
action as the only remaining option for such individuals. As evidenced in
this Comment, the U.S.’ immigration laws do not address the current or
the future challenges associated with climate change migration. The
intricacies and severity of this issue must promptly be acknowledged, and
the individuals adversely affected must be afforded the opportunity to
rebuild without a lingering fear of sudden removal. Through formal
classification of climate migrants, the restructuring of current immigration
law, and interdisciplinary efforts to minimize harmful emissions into the
environment, the U.S. can emerge as a trailblazer on this important and
complex global issue.

